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Abstract
Transnational gentrifications have been occurring at the crossroads of capital investment fuelled
to satisfy the remarkable increase of so-called leisure-oriented mobilities. Such mobilities, how-
ever, cause disruptive social, spatial and economic transformations of urban and rural landscapes
across the globe. Consequently, transnational gentrifications may be considered a crucial testimo-
nial of economic shifts, during the 2008–2020 period of accumulation. In this article, we argue
that the underlying conceptual assumptions of transnational gentrifications require crucial adjust-
ments. We should especially consider the intellectual roots that simply celebrate leisure-oriented
mobilities while setting aside the exclusionary social practices of the consumption of space, cul-
ture, heritage and place. We do this by interpreting the phenomenon by means of a political
economy that understands (i) the lens of the multi-scalar organisation of state power as a centre-
piece for orchestrating the conditions for transnational gentrifications; (ii) transnational middle-
class leisure-oriented mobilities linked dichotomously with labour precariousness and flexibility;
and (iii) the rent gap as an analytical tool to understand dispossession, and corresponding displa-
cement of people, practices and discourses. This approach sheds light on the nuances of gentrifi-
cation as an attribute of systemic violence exercised in financialised capitalism. It also supports us
to sketch out a theoretically informed outlook for the ongoing reorientation of intertwined gen-
trifications by transnational capital investments with intermittent flows of people in the aftermath
of the COVID-19 pandemic.
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Ooh, Corona! Is this the end of
transnational gentrifications?
The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered a
global crisis unprecedented in peacetime, yet
with important resemblance to the 2008 glo-
bal financial crisis. Just as the repercussions
of the last crisis altered real estate markets
globally with significant long-term effects on
housing and urban neighbourhoods in the
North Atlantic hemisphere (Aalbers, 2020;
Beswick et al., 2016), the pandemic’s impacts
will now also significantly reshape the future
of our cities. This will have immense conse-
quences on how we perceive, appropriate
and use space, challenging many assump-
tions about how urban life unfolds. Authors
like Lancione and Simone (2020) have
expressed that as a consequence of the
COVID-19 emergency, the interaction in cit-
ies and control of space will change dramati-
cally. At the moment, we can only speculate
about what consequences this will have. For
example, we do not know whether we are
about to experience even more authoritarian
neoliberalisation, or alternatively whether
this crisis will offer opportunities for auton-
omous ways of exploring Corona-devalu-
ated urban environments. However, as we
will subsequently discuss, the pandemic
relates directly to multi-faceted transna-
tional gentrifications, which are motivating
the analytical effort of the contributions to
this special issue (Hayes and Zaban, 2020).
The term transnational gentrification was
first coined as a phenomenon that ‘connects
redevelopment capital to housing demand
not within a single city-region but transna-
tionally, thus creating new possibilities for
profitable housing reinvestment [.] in mar-
kets where such possibilities would not have
existed on the basis of local demand alone’
(Sigler and Wachsmuth, 2016: 706). Hence,
it responds to the remarkable increase of so-
called leisure-oriented mobilities at the
crossroads of rapidly expanding tourism and
other ephemeral moves of people. Prior to
the COVID-19 emergency, such mobilities
had seen more than a decade-long expansion
into nearly every corner of the planet.
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Corresponding to rent gaps derived from
(international) tourism and transnational
mobilities, we consider the resulting transna-
tional gentrifications as testimonial of socio-
spatial and economic shifts experienced in
the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. A
common denominator was that spaces and
places were converted by rendering neigh-
bourhoods accessible to transnational con-
sumption, causing disruptive social, spatial
and economic transformations of urban and
rural landscapes (Hayes, 2018; Janoschka
and Haas, 2014). In this regard, tourism and
transnational mobilities were considered a
centrepiece for resolving the post-2008 dis-
ruptions in the flows of capital; alongside
the creation of fictitious capital and debt as
characteristics for existing models of neolib-
eral governance (Harvey, 2020).
Since tourism and corresponding leisure-
oriented mobilities were brought to a halt in
nearly every country of the world in March
2020 (United Nations World Tourism
Organisation [UNWTO], 2020), the
COVID-19 emergency has exposed the dis-
tortions and imbalances of a productive
apparatus shaped by neoliberalisation
(Desai, 2020) overemphasising experiential
consumerism (Harvey, 2020). In line with
Cresswell (2020), we argue that pre-
pandemic mobilities will shift significantly
once travel bans are lifted again, and this
will produce geographically uneven impacts
on places that accommodate transnational
gentrification. It can be expected that new
practices of accumulation will arise, and,
similarly to previous crises, new grounds for
novel gentrifications may be created
(Davidson and Lees, 2005).
Consequently, while the COVID-19 pan-
demic will differ from previous crises, we
agree with Aalbers (2020) that property will
become even more popular as an investment
vehicle for capital accumulation. Beyond
sharpening the strategies of institutional
investors, the post-COVID-19 asset
valorisation may be elaborated by novel
social divides. Previously, the democratisa-
tion of property ownership as promoted by
the liberalisation of credit markets and
impelled by wage stagnation allowed
expanding rates of owner-occupation
(Alexandri and Janoschka, 2018). The Janus
face of the elevated mortgage and house
prices was the expansion of private rental
markets for those unable to enter the prop-
erty market based on average wage (Adkins
and Konings, 2020). During the Corona-
induced quarantines middle-class home-
owners received mortgage protection and
enjoyed safe employment from home. In
many cases, working class tenants comprised
those essential workers serving face-to-face
the society and the economy outside the
safety of home. While new housing invest-
ments may become opportune for those
profiting from the pandemic catastasis, for
those unable to maintain the Corona-crisis
due to job loss and household arrears
another housing crisis might be at the gates.
Moreover, such patterns that allow housing
accumulation for some at the expense of
overpriced private rental housing of others
may signify new routes of ‘post-pandemic’
transnational gentrifications.
In order to grasp the emerging ‘post-pan-
demic’ transnational gentrifications, we
focus primarily on the exclusionary social
and consumption practices inherent to
leisure-oriented mobilities and the corre-
sponding commodification of space, culture,
heritage and place. Hence, our focus is to
interpret transnational gentrification
through a political economy angle that
understands (i) the lens of the multi-scalar
organisation of state power as a centrepiece
for orchestrating the conditions to capital
accumulation; (ii) transnational mobilities
linked dichotomously with labour precar-
iousness; and (iii) the rent gap as an analyti-
cal tool to understand dispossession, and the
corresponding displacement of people,
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practices and discourses. We will accord-
ingly develop each of these perspectives in
the subsequent sections, demonstrating that
they coincide in providing nuanced and cor-
related understandings of financialised capit-
alism as an epistemic violence. The
concluding final section will then unite these
aspects, providing explanations for the reor-
ientation of transnational gentrifications in
the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic.
While this complements the contributions to
this special issue, it may also impact main-
stream discussions on gentrification, the
right to the city and urban (in)justice.
COVID-19 and the selective
power of the state
For a better understanding of pre- and post-
pandemic transnational gentrifications, we
attend to the fundamental interplay of poli-
tics and neoliberal economic restructuring
taking place, but more importantly attempt
to interpret the interruptions to ‘normality’
we have just witnessed across the world. As
experienced during the COVID-19 enforced
quarantines, states are effectively controlling
space and bodies. The closure of borders, the
regionalisation of spatial data about the pan-
demic, the enforcement of multi-scalar lock-
downs of populations, as well as phone apps
tracking mobility, all demonstrate that terri-
torialised state power is decisive. However,
more specific questions need answering:
What lessons can be learned from pandemic-
related involvement regarding the state’s
ability to organise urban investment flows?
Which interests are served by temporarily
interrupting and then reorganising accumu-
lation in and through space? And how does
this relate with transnational gentrification?
Clearly, answers to these questions
remain speculative at the point of writing.
However, it has been clear from the very
beginning that the exercised lockdowns and
social distancing have seriously interrupted
place consumption, as well as reorganised
tourism and mobilities at least temporarily.
Since mobility-related consumerism was cen-
tral in orchestrating transnational gentrifica-
tions between 2008 and 2020, it makes sense
to recall some lessons from this period to
address the potential consequences of the
COVID-19 pandemic.
From this standpoint, we initially con-
sider the relation between the multi-scalar
organisation of state power and capital as
part of relentless socio-spatial relations
developed through capitalist urbanisation
(Brenner, 2019). The role of the state in
anticipating capital flows like investments in
urban development has been present in much
of the critical debate about urban neolibera-
lisation (Peck, 2017). A first lesson drawn
from previous analysis is that urban policies
and gentrifications bear the stamp of the
selective multi-scalar power of the state.
Economic decisions on growth and develop-
ment are rooted in political stakes over deva-
luation or revalorisation of space (Smith,
1996). When considering the urban, inter-
ventions promoting gentrification should be
explicitly envisaged as political decisions that
accentuate power relations attached to real
estate investment and finance. Such deci-
sions occur in a field of power struggles, and
they are encouraged and supported by differ-
ent fractions of the ruling elites (Alexandri,
2018). This argument indicates that the pan-
demic’s crisis resolution may reinforce or
shift such power positions. For instance, the
economic reorganisation in Europe follow-
ing the 2008 financial crisis made prominent
the role of transnational financial capital,
against the interests of traditional investment
channels (Alexandri and Janoschka, 2018).
Similarly, as a consequence of COVID-19
we may witness significant geopolitical
power shifts, as well as new regimes regulat-
ing the flows of capital and people
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differently, allowing novel pathways for cap-
ital accumulation.
Recalling the aftermath of the 2008 finan-
cial crisis, state policies also emphasised a
further shift to urban consumerism by pro-
moting infrastructural investments in air-
ports and airlines, hospitality, recreational
activities and related logistics that endorsed
an increase in capital turnovers (Harvey,
2020). This exacerbated existing trends from
the 1990s onwards as well as the move to
urban entrepreneurialism, which was the
political background of tourism-induced
transnational gentrification. The insights
provided by Hayes (2020) on the spatial
reorganisation of UNESCO’s heritage urban
landscapes, as well as Navarrete Escobedo’s
(2020) analysis of value extraction through
heritage urbanism in San Miguel de Allende,
Mexico, demonstrate how transnational gen-
trification was widely promoted via urban
interventions supporting the tourist/heritage
real estate complex and targeting the mobile
middle classes as ephemeral residents.
However, even more important for the
socio-spatial nexus between international
tourism and event-based consumerism was
the development of platform economies that
eased rapidly increasing turnovers
(Mezzadra and Nielson, 2019). Platform
capitalism has permitted a spectacular accel-
eration of real estate extractivism, including
the transformation of local housing stock in
inner-city neighbourhoods to short-term
rentals. Illustrative of this trend is the dis-
ruptive innovation of Airbnb, a company
founded in 2008. The negative consequences
of this for long-term residents and other
related uses have triggered response from
social movements and critical urban
researchers in many tourist cities across
Europe (Novy and Colomb, 2019). These
negative consequences are also addressed in
this special issue, with contributors provid-
ing progressively nuanced explanations of
the local impacts of platform-mediated lei-
sure-oriented mobilities (Ardura Urquiaga
et al., 2020; Cocola-Gant and Lopez-Gay,
2020; Jover and Dı´az-Parra, 2019).
On the other hand, the temporality and
intensiveness of gentrification also rely on
the state’s capacity to impose its own rhythm
on the production of and social reproduc-
tion in space. While states with strong eco-
nomic bases manage rapid returns from
gentrification for real estate and financial
stakeholders, in other cases, local contingen-
cies may enforce different velocities of capi-
talist penetration (Janoschka et al., 2014).
On the other hand, case studies from Latin
American and African cities suggest that
gentrification may develop slowly through
time, beyond planning efforts and policies to
attract tourist flows and transnational gen-
trifiers (Janoschka, 2016; Visser, 2019). In
such cases of slow gentrification, tourism
and associated real estate businesses are
often enacted to intensify and to speed up
value extraction from the city (for an excel-
lent explanation of such temporality, see
Zaban, 2019).
States engage with a variety of agents to
develop gentrification into a mature urban
process, for instance by accelerating the
rhythms of accumulation. Additionally, they
also link their tourism and mobility policies
with real estate development (Janoschka,
2009). In supporting this strategy, tourists, fes-
tival and conference guides, airline brochures
and city portals mainly refer to gentrified
places as reinvented areas that offer a distinc-
tive experience of urban uniqueness. As
Bantman-Masum (2019) argues, tourism and
transnational gentrification develop following
state interventions aiming to expedite markets
for transient and highly mobile people. The
need for rapid capital turnovers explains why
the recreation of space focuses mainly on the
‘outsider, the investor, the developer business-
man [sic] or tourist’ (Swyngedouw et al., 2002:
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454). In this regard, in the aftermath of the
Corona crisis, we may expect new coalitions
between states and capital to emerge so as to
restructure the urban voids left behind by the
breakdown of the pre-2020 accumulation
model based on tourism and consumption. In
this respect, it is important to consider that
international travel reached record numbers
in 2019 (UNWTO, 2020), and further growth
was expected. This growth in tourism and
leisure-oriented mobilities was an obvious sign
that the post-2008 recovery model had already
gone beyond the carrying capacity of many
places. For instance, social movements orga-
nising substantial protest under the umbrella
of so-called ‘tourism-phobia’ (Blanco-Romero
et al., 2019; Huete and Mantecon, 2018;
Janoschka and Mota, 2020), and emerging
political experiments in cities like Barcelona
(Blanco et al., 2020), confirm locals’ deep dis-
satisfaction with the effects of over-tourism.
Transnational gentrifications
and labour precariousness:
A dichotomous link
This special issue tackles the imperative task
of de-centring the complex relations between
the transnational mobilities of people and
the sphere of consumption in the construc-
tion of tourist and leisure destinations
(Hayes and Zaban, forthcoming). In this
task, the contentious dichotomy between
leisure-oriented mobilities and the increasing
labour precariousness experienced across the
globe provides valuable insights into post-
COVID-19 transnational gentrification. At
this point, the recourse to gentrification the-
ory may be highly valued. Firstly, we may
emphasise that architectural tastes and the
consumption of space and culture are
mediated. Bantman-Masum (2019) discusses
the example of Paris’ Anglo coffee shops by
revisiting Zukin’s (1989) influential work on
how cosmopolitan spaces of consumption
are created as cool, authentic, alternative and
trendy.
Crucial to sustaining such urban markets
is the simultaneous construction of agents
able to maintain restless consumption. In
targeting the mobile middle classes as such,
freedom of movement becomes a signifier of
a brimming habitus of consumption of space
and vice versa. Moreover, flexible labour
and remote working policies are tuned to
middle-class aspirations of freedom that
nurture spatial inquiries for consumption.
As consumption of the urban is sought on
the basis of the arbitrage power of the white
middle class, this pursuit is actually facili-
tated by geographically uneven develop-
ment. This correlation is captured by
McElroy (2019), showing how digital
nomads exercise economic superiority in
Romania. High salaries paid from interna-
tional companies to employees working
from home are better enjoyed in places that
offer – in transnational gentrifiers’ standards
– affordable housing and cheerful leisure
environments, however highly priced for
local populations. We understand this as
egoism exercised in space; a process framed
by Hayes (2020) in discussing US pen-
sioners’ arbitrage visions of enjoying later
age in prosperity in Cuenca (Ecuador), as
well as in other UNESCO heritage cities
across Latin America. Moreover, in Europe
this is chiefly translated into Southern
European cities serving as leisure destina-
tions for Northern Europeans and North
Americans (Ardura Urquiaga et al., 2020;
Cocola-Gant and Lopez-Gay, 2020; Jover
and Dı´az-Parra, 2019). Crucial to this is
mobile middle classes’ ambition to fulfil
individualistic dreams of a better life, but
also the underlying processes within capital-
ism, discursively producing such self-
centredness through urban imaginaries
maintained by global divisions of labour.
Cocola-Gant and Lopez-Gay (2020) and
Bantman-Masum (2019) shed light on this
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direction by discussing how spatial divisions
of labour help to subordinate places of con-
sumption to global spaces of production.
New urban labour regulations are set on
marginal employees whose precarity
becomes essential in the promotion of real
estate businesses in gentrifying places in
cheaper destinations. Casualisation of
labour is further promoted by 24/7 labour
availability by outsourced employees of the
tourism and hospitality industry. This
unevenness is also accentuated by the com-
modification of basic necessities for social
reproduction (homes, food, water and trans-
port) that relegate to precarious positions
dissociated from educational qualifications.
The value extracted from this precarious
urban labour to serve the appetites of the
mobile clientele is crucial in promoting gen-
trification. Put differently, the urban experi-
ence that stimulates the lucrative behaviour
of the middle classes cannot be produced
without local labour exploitation in gentri-
fied locations. With pressures on labour
growing by the massive destruction of jobs
in and after the COVID-19 emergency, this
relation is prone to become the key asset of
how capital accumulation may be restored
and fuelled after the current crisis. The
increasingly normalised proliferation of flex-
ible labour relations, including home office
arrangements, will spur individual choices
and trade-offs regarding the location of
one’s (permanent and temporary) residence,
while place-bound labour may become even
more precarious.
White elephants in the room:
Rent gaps, displacement and
dispossession
Grasping gentrifications relies on disclosing
the dynamics of property markets, their
structures and their reshuffling, to better
extract exchange values from the city. For
this, the ownership of land is crucial (Haila,
2016). As profitability is merely inscribed on
the ability of landlords to seize rents and
profits from properties (Slater, 2017), the
recipients of rising rents are the ones who
enjoy the fruits of gentrification.
Consequently, gentrification becomes ever
more penetrated by global capital flows
seeking to capture yields from urban invest-
ments (Smith, 1996). Rent gaps as indicators
of the potential profit that can be extracted
from space act as catalysts in this movement
of transnational capital (Haila, 2016).
Platforms such as Airbnb captured this ten-
dency by institutionalising asset investments
in tourism and leisure destinations
(Wachsmuth and Weisler, 2018). The differ-
ence between the relatively low costs of
investment to the potential yield from short-
term rentals soon transformed neighbour-
hoods into tourism oases (Cocola-Gant and
Lopez-Gay, 2020). In this regard, investors
help accelerate the financialisation of hous-
ing, spreading an entrepreneurial attitude in
local markets that emphasise exchange val-
ues over the use value of the home as a shel-
ter and for social reproduction (Haila, 2016).
Rent gaps and surplus values also become
indicators of the state’s ability to absorb
financial risks while cycles of corporate and
real estate power enjoy profits (Swyngedouw
et al., 2002). In this regard, rent gap theory
helps to explain social and spatial injustice
as a consequence of dispossessions. Local
populations unable to maintain the high
rents that gentrifications, hence transna-
tional gentrifications bring, are forced out.
However, the resulting displacement is not
univocal but rather a process with economic,
material, symbolic and political dimensions
(Janoschka, 2016). In this regard, economic
and material displacement are the result of
landlords’ speculative behaviour: the pri-
mary causes are rent increases, negligence of
maintenance or even unwillingness to renew
leases with lower-income families. This is the
kind of displacement that receives most
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media and research attention, as it is rarely
and only partially observed in the few sta-
t(e)istics available at the local level
(Janoschka et al., 2014).
However, displacement is a process with
temporal relativity. Through actively chal-
lenging past lived experiences of place by
transforming the (urban) present of land
uses and users, it culminates with the act of
eviction; an act the owner inflicts on a ren-
ter. This way, displacements inscribe in
space the essential stigma of power relations
crucial for gentrification. Moreover,
gentrification-induced displacements express
the violence of contested social relations
directly related to five essential dimensions
of social reproduction: housing, land, com-
mons such as public space, mobility and
autonomy of subjects (Janoschka, 2016). In
transnational gentrification, as urban land-
scape transformations cater to the consump-
tion habits of a mobile clientele, lifelong
tenants experience changes in local ame-
nities, with discomfort developing into a
broader sense of unhoming (Atkinson, 2015;
Janoschka et al., 2020). The resulting sym-
bolic displacement is associated with this
symbolic violence of everyday life. As a
result of gentrification, lower-class subjectiv-
ities are discursively stigmatised, essentially
determining that dispossession is related to
the dispute over cultural hegemony regard-
ing everyday practices (Janoschka, 2016).
Stigmatisation is experienced much earlier
than the final eviction, inflicting emotional
and material anxieties over tenure insecurity
and increasing de-familiarisation with space
(Atkinson, 2015). With the materialisation
of eviction from the neighbourhood, the
underlying symbolic message is that eco-
nomic and political weakness of the vulnera-
ble is not tolerated in a gentrifying place.
The simultaneous construction of social
admiration towards other better-off prac-
tices and users, such as transnational gentri-
fiers or tourists, leads to the creation of
urban spaces tailored to the preferences of
mobile middle-class individuals – that is,
those who have the final say on the defini-
tion of contemporary spatiality. Our own
research from Latin America demonstrates
the crucial role of symbolic displacement
(Janoschka, 2016), while in Greece, for
example, refugees are pushed back from
land and water boarders, yet the arrival of
the first post-COVID-19 international tour-
ists was welcomed in a regional airport in
Crete with a festive environment offering
traditional sweets and performing tradi-
tional music. This kind of cultural subordi-
nation captures the unquestioned need to
provide social admiration to the privileged
internationally mobile classes.
Beyond this, displacement intrinsically
also has political dimensions, as it becomes
part of the deliverables of urban policy or the
unintentional side effect of urban renewal. In
producing displacement, urban policies
simultaneously include a tolerance for legal
violations linked with corruption, nepotism
and other relations not foreseen in planning
laws (Janoschka, 2016). However, the velo-
city of displacement may imprint the political
importance of gentrification. In many cases,
the displaced develop a crucial agency oppos-
ing the drivers of gentrification by essentially
claiming their right to the city. Displacement
then enters the agenda of local contestation,
and the struggles for survivability (Lees et al.,
2018) against space dispossession become a
strong claim for the right to a dignified urban
habitat. Hence, the political dimension of dis-
placement inscribes these conflictive oppo-
sites in the political sphere since they pose
issues of social and spatial justice. This is of
crucial importance, as we note below.
Say it: (Transnational)
gentrification is violence!
In this final section we aim to present a theo-
retically informed perspective of the violence
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of financialised capitalism by looking into
the method, the structure and the dynamics
of gentrification. For this, the role of the
state, the locally imbricated realisation of
rent gaps and the intrinsic violence of displa-
cement and dispossession should be noted.
This approach disputes tendencies on plane-
tary gentrifications and rent gaps (Slater,
2017; Wyly, 2015), which are to some extent
inspired by dialogues with planetary urbani-
sation (Brenner and Schmid, 2012).
As mobilities of capital and people
develop around the globe, an intellectual slip
towards a totalising planetary argumenta-
tion when considering transnational gentrifi-
cation and touristification appears
persuasive at first sight. However, this spe-
cial issue offers rich case studies that buttress
the specificity of the local in transnational
gentrification and look into local dynamics
and specificities. From such insights we learn
that capitalist appropriation thrives along-
side urbanisation. This relation explains the
economic superstructure that the term plane-
tary adheres to. However, this standpoint
obscures the messy webs of the material and
symbolic, the richness of daily microstruc-
tures as marked through lived experiences of
place and local contestations (Oswin, 2018)
and the colonial ties, patriarchy and racisms
exercised in space (McLean, 2018; Reddy,
2018). Perceiving gentrification via an
abstract planetary norm might lead to a false
perception that it is an urban process assem-
bled in a single form as prescribed in cities of
the North Atlantic hemisphere. Such percep-
tion veils the necessary micro-contingencies
of the local level, as well as the processes of
place valorisation and value abstraction. In
this case, the term planetary may prove to be
too abstract and obfuscating (Loftus, 2018).
Indeed, we may argue that gentrification is
a local phenomenon grounded on social speci-
ficities and spatial inequalities that allow rent
gaps. The social environment, the displaced-
to-be communities and their social interactions
are eminently local, and often produce the
potential ground rents. When this is valorised,
selective policies and real estate markets push
to fill the rent gaps. In the aftermath of the
financial crisis and, as we also believe, in post-
pandemic times, international rent-seeking
activities invest in these locally developed rent
gaps to extract value from place.
The agents involved in gentrification as
financiers, corporate developers and owners
coincide in many cases with the same power-
ful capitalists that produce consumers’ taste
for touristic or transnational gentrified
spaces (Gotham, 2005). Moreover, as the
locational preferences of the mobile middles
classes essentially depend on the structures
of land, property and housing (Slater, 2017),
they may be evenly driven by market con-
structions of a taste for place distinctiveness.
And as gentrification leads to social and spa-
tial dispossession through displacement, it
also illustrates other forms of violence like
patriarchy, (local) colonialism, racism and
heteronormativity. Hence, the multi-faceted
violence that nurtures gentrification includes
the linguistic violence of dominant discourse.
This dismisses the importance of lower-class
subjectivities in space reproduction while
accentuating the cultural superiority of the
mobile and privileged middle classes.
Equally, the violence of architecture and of
aesthetics manipulates tastes and effectively
generates new markets for consumption
after selectively attaching elements of popu-
lar culture. Within this interplay between
selective appearance and the domination of
inclined in moral superiority of middle class
habitus, we identify the violence concealed
in the moral authority of who and what
should be allowed in the processes of appro-
priation of urban space. Alongside this lies
the violence of the police, which is primarily
discussed in gentrification theories as a
materially masculine expression of discipline
and control over habits, gender and race (for
detailed elaboration, see Janoschka, 2018).
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In the years after the 2008 crisis, the vio-
lent urban interaction of tourism and gentri-
fication has provoked social and spatial
transformations. Historic city centres have
experienced the turmoil of Airbnb, pushing
out residents to the urban peripheries. For
instance, former social housing units, cur-
rently owned by international investors, like
Blackstone, have absorbed these flows of the
displaced, as former – thus more deprived –
social housing tenants had already been
evicted further towards the urban periph-
eries (Janoschka et al., 2020). While this pro-
cess of chain displacements exemplarity
illustrates the post-2008 urban reshuffling in
the Spanish cities of Madrid and Barcelona,
we believe that the lessons learned on the
interplay between gentrification, tourism
and housing financialisation apply to many
places around the globe. Gentrification
becomes the spatial representation of a
growing perception of the urban as carrying
infinite exchange values. These values are
sought by powerful owners who enjoy
remarkable profits from urban investments.
As discussed by Sassen (2014), the condition
of housing under financialisation acquires
similar characteristics to those of gold: a
means to dispossess, accumulate and capture
further wealth.
Tourism, transnational mobility and
housing financialisation accentuate this ten-
dency through gentrification. Although
there are voices that consider touristification
as disentangled from the structural dynamics
of gentrification (Sequera and Nofre, 2019),
we would argue that such an approach
would simply be misleading. Cocola-Gant
and Lopez-Gay (2020) challenge such asser-
tions by providing empirical evidence
addressing explicitly the induced displace-
ment that links touristification to gentrifica-
tion. Moreover, elucidating the rich
analytical grounds and methodological tools
that the theory of gentrification offers for
understanding the structural violence of
capitalist urban transformations may end up
creating further academic perplexity over the
idleness of the concept. But such mystifica-
tions may prove even more perilous if they are
picked up by policy advisers who seek to
encourage post-COVID-19 tourism and urban
regeneration, by using linguistics that certify
the absence of gentrification and eschew the
violence of the resulting dispossession.
In the post-COVID-19 urban condition,
we would expect gentrification to extend and
expand in space with the same violence of
the ‘virus’ of financialised capitalism, by
prioritising the exchange values of re-
invented assets and spaces, and side-stepping
the use values. A crucial question is how the
tsunami of money leveraged by central
banks with zero interest rates accelerated by
platform capitalism will engage with space,
and how urbanity will be reinvented. Most
importantly, with labour markets being
severely impacted from rapidly rising unem-
ployment levels, new norms of exploitation
will emerge. While tourism will take new
forms, new needs and new gentrified markets
will be created to sustain leisure-oriented
mobilities. In this regard, social mobilities
may be restricted and become highly privi-
leged and more selective. From this stance,
we consider that gentrification will be
expressed with novel processes of displace-
ment (which might also be orchestrated
through platform capitalism), and will relate
more strongly to labour precarity and dis-
possession. Nonetheless, the method and
structural powers of gentrification remain
the same throughout time: flows of users
and uses, rent gaps and speculation in real
estate are overlooked (if not supported) by
policies that guarantee violent dispossession,
enforced displacement and gentrification.
As we can already see, daily lives and
mobilities will have changed significantly in
the post-pandemic era. New social,
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economic and political constellations will
allow the spatial reorganisation of capital
movement. The temporal obstacles engen-
dered by public health concerns and climate
change materiality may point to new forms
of violence – social and spatial dispossession
in the form of new types of gentrification.
However, in the post-COVID-19 condition,
social solidarities and urban contestation
will have also matured into new forms of
struggle. Learning experiences from con-
testations against housing and space com-
modification developed in the previous
decade will heighten and strengthen the
need to claim the right to the city differently.
The struggle for survivability may develop
into the necessary political and social power
needed for challenging the post-COVID-19
underlying forces of gentrification. It will
then become the task of concerned social
researchers to develop novel understandings
of the underlying violence that discloses the
specificities of post-COVID-19 gentrification
to nourish solidarity for social and spatial
justice.
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